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Security

devvm's job is to keep what runs in a VM away from your machine. The security model explains what devvm protects, how it does it, and what it doesn't protect.

Report a vulnerability

Report a vulnerability privately through GitHub's vulnerability reporting, not in a public issue. Include the devvm version from devvm --version, the host OS, the Lima version and the steps to reproduce it.

Verifying a release

Each release's SHA256SUMS lists the checksums of its archives and of its install.sh, and it's signed with minisign. The release key's public half, which is also in packaging/minisign.pub, is:

RWSjzFsn7ETaijKJ2y7F4DtZobXmyv+LmdclJwZP/KmAkLUwOCzWF/2b

The install script checks the signature when minisign is installed. The script and the key in it come from the same release, though, so that check can't catch a release that someone replaced whole. Homebrew's checksum can, because it's kept in a separate repository, and so can your own check with the key above, because it doesn't come from the release. The signature and what it trusts has the details.

To check a release by hand, run these in the folder with its files:

minisign -Vm SHA256SUMS -P RWSjzFsn7ETaijKJ2y7F4DtZobXmyv+LmdclJwZP/KmAkLUwOCzWF/2b
shasum -a 256 -c --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS

Checking the install script shows how to download the script, SHA256SUMS and its signature, check them, then run the script.

What counts

Anything that breaks the security model counts, for example:

  • Code in a VM reaching the host, by writing outside its project folder, changing .git hooks or config while they're locked, or running code on the host.
  • A VM reaching another VM's files, or devvm's state in ~/.local/share/devvm and ~/.config/devvm.
  • Secrets, logins or SSH keys reaching a VM that should have only a placeholder.
  • A VM with network policy reaching a host that isn't allowed, the host's own services, or private addresses.
  • Credentials or host files ending up in an image or a shared tool image.

Out of scope

  • What Attack vectors lists under Narrowed, not closed and Left to you, such as what allowed hosts and secrets permit. That includes open VMs, which a VM is when you choose the open tier or pass --network open.
  • Escapes through Lima, QEMU or Apple's Virtualization framework themselves, which you should report upstream. Do tell us if devvm uses them in an unsafe way.